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3 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Development Projects Division

SUBJECT : Trip Report -
(14 - 25 October 1960)

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The following observations are made concerning matters of security interest noted during this trip:

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1. The wooden hanger previously spotted by was surveyed from a security standpoint. To say the least, the location of this hanger is not the most desirable from this view. It is situated in a very exposed location, close to a main access road to this The following security deficiencies were noted:

a. The location is exposed to numerous persons entering and departing this base each week day.

b. A busy access road exists approximately one hundred feet behind the hanger.

c. Several buildings close to the hanger (two within 40 feet) are occupied by personnel.

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d. A motor pool is in close proximity to the hanger.

2. From the safety standpoint, it also struck the writer that the building is definitely a potential fire trap, and provisions will have to be made for several emergency exits.

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3. An alternative location on this base, which was suggested by is in a much more secluded location. However, it would be necessary to erect a hanger on the existing hardstand. From the security standpoint, this latter location would be a 100% preferable location to the wooden hanger site.

4. It was proposed that the prebriefing and personnel equipment area currently employed under the Program could be used by Detachment H. These rooms are located some distance from

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the hanger, and the observation was made by the writer that the transportation of the drivers from the briefing area to the hanger could well alert anyone on the base that a mission is in the offing. It was pointed out by [redacted] that the same facilities would be utilized for training missions as well as operational missions, and it would not be possible to distinguish when an operational mission is to be run. The building housing these rooms appeared to be sound and could be secured to discourage unauthorized access to the equipment housed therein. It must be noted, however, that the plans for Detachment II do not call for the maintenance of U. S. security personnel to maintain the security of this building. Reliance would have to be placed upon [redacted] for the provision of appropriate security for this building.

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5. As a matter of interest, it was noted that the personnel equipment stored in this building, which it is believed is currently employed under the DOG Program, bears USAF markings in many instances.

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6. Certain basic items to be considered in the implementation of the security program for Detachment II would include:

a. The erection of a fence (anchor type preference) around three sides of the hanger.

b. A construction of restricted area rooms in the hanger to house the Camo shop and the CIA area wherein classified information would be stored.

c. The maintenance of twenty-four hour coverage of the interior of the hanger by Agency personnel.

d. The possible installation of an electronic alarm system which would alert the American Charge of Quarters of an attempted penetration of the Building during off-duty hours.

e. Perimeter security would be handled by [redacted] personnel.

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f. An adequate number of safe-type cabinets would be required.

g. A classified waste incinerator will be necessary.

h. A badge system will have to be worked out in conjunction with the [redacted] to enable the identification of authorized persons desiring access into the hanger area.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt